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The Effects of Taxation on the Merger Decision
ABSTRACT
This paper presents estimates of the tax benefits generated by a sample
of U.S. mergers and acquisitions involving two public corporations over the
period 1968-83 and estimates a "marriage model" based on differences between
these mergers and another sample of "pseudomergers" that did not occur to
determine the impact of these tax benefits on the probability of two firms
combining.
Our findings reject the hypothesis that leverage played a large role in
fostering these transactions, and that the tax losses and credits of acquired
firms likewise exerted no impact on merger activity. Though the use of such
benefits by acquiring firms to shield profits of other firms did increase the
level of activity, the impact was quite small.
On the whole, our results suggest that the changes in tax provisions with
respect to mergers introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a small
impact on U.S. mergers and acquisitions.
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National Bureau of Economic Research Department of Economics
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 868—3900 (617) 495—60661. Introduction
The recent merger wave in the United States has left observers attempting
to uncover explanations for the strong growth in takeover activity. Some have
suggested that tax factors have played an important role. Indeed, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 contains several provisions that became effective at the
beginning of 1987 that were aimed specifically at reducing the tax benefits
available through merger. In two earlier papers (Auerbach and Reishus, 1987a,
1987b), we estimated the tax benefits generated by 318 mergers and takeovers
that occurred in the the U.S. during the period 1968-83, and considered
whether the level and type of tax benefits available affected the structure of
the merger transactions. Our findings suggested that while tax benefits do
not appear to be important in the majority of transactions involving large
public corporations, there is a significant minority of transactions in which
the benefits appeared significant enough to play a role in the decision to
merge.
By focusing exclusively on mergers that occurred, we were able to
estimate the size of the tax benefits involved, but not the role that these
benefits played in the actual merger process. The presence of such benefits
is a necessary condition for tax factors to influence merger activity, but not
a sufficient one. Given the complex issues involved in changing ownership and
management of a company, it is entirely possible that tax benefits, even where
significant, come into play only tiat the margin," once other conditions have
been satisfied. Thus, it remains unclear whether the tax benefits received by
merging firms represent more than simple transfers to the parties involved, or—2—
whether the frequency and pattern of takeovers has been significantly
influenced by the availability of such tax benefits.
The present paper aims to resolve this question by comparing the sample
of mergers which we previously analyzed to "pseudomergers" that did not occur,
drawn from random combinations of firms in a broad sample of U.S.
corporations. By estimating a "marriage model" based on the differences
between mergers that occurred and those that did not, we are able to
discern whether the tax benefits observed in mergers were available with the
same size and frequency in the population as a whole (conditional on other
factors), or whether the tax benefits were larger than would have occurred by
chance, as would be the case if tax factors increased the likelihood of a
merger.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section discusses
the tax treatment of mergers and acquisitions and what the potential tax
benefits of a merger are. Section 3 describes our merger sample and the
findings we previously reported on the tax benefits from these mergers and the
relation of such benefits to the structure of the transactions. Section 4
describes the underlying model of merger activity that we use to generate the
multinomial logit specification of the merger decision, and how we deal with
the estimation problem introduced by the large number of alternative mergers
in which a firm could engage. Section 5 describes the sampling procedure used
to create the pseudomerger sample and the calculation of variables used in the
estimation, and Section 6 presents the empirical estimates themselves. The
final section offers some brief conclusions concerning the implications of the
recent tax law changes for the level of merger activity.—3--
2.Tax Benefits from Merger Activity
There are several different ways that companies may reduce taxes through
a merger or acquisition, and tax benefits can accrue at both the corporate and
shareholder levels. In some cases, the tax benefits from a corporate
combination are also available through other means, and such benefits should
not necessarily be attributed to the merger process. The following
description, except where noted, applies to the law in force before 1987, when
the mergers in our sample occurred.
A.Corporate Taxation
There are three types of potential corporate tax benefit associated with
the combination of two public corporations: increased utilization of tax loss
and tax credit carryforwards, increased depreciation deductions obtainedby
stepping up the basis of assets, and increased interest deductions associated
with an increase in the debt-equity ratio of the combined enterprise.
1. Tax Losses and Credits
Under the tax law, both present and past, corporations with negative
taxable income may claim tax refunds based on these losses only to the extent
of the previous three years' taxable income (net of intervening losses).Any
additional losses must be carried forward, without interest, until the firm
has taxable income sufficient to offset them or until they expire,now after
15 years and before 1981 after 5 years. Estimates in Auerbach and Poterba
(1987) and Altshuler and Auerbach (1986) suggest that for theaverage large
corporation experiencing tax losses, the present value of tax refunds so
deferred is on the order of half their face value, due to deferral and—4—
expiration. Because each of these papers derives estimates from samples of
firms that continued to operate independently, they may overstate the true
population average, since one would expect disappearance from the sample to be
negatively correlated with the likelihood of becoming taxable in the near
future.
Further restrictions exist on the use of investment tax credits. Until
1977 firms could offset at most half of their taxable income, after deduction
of losses carried back and forward, with investment tax credits. (This
fraction rose to .85 by 1982.) Altshuler and Auerbach estimate that the number
of firms paying taxes but carrying credits forward was even larger than the
number of firms carrying losses forward and paying no taxes. The size of
these tax benefits can be quite substantial. Auerbach and Poterba found
several cases of firms carrying forward losses with a face value of tax
refunds in excess of the firm's equity value, suggesting not only that these
firms had very low values as the result of poor performance, but also that the
market did not expect them to obtain close to the full face value of the tax
benefits.
Combination with a "fully" taxable firm that has no tax losses and the
potential to absorb more credits than it is currently claiming can increase
the value of such a firm's tax benefits. Under prior law, a taxable firm
could offset the losses and credits of an acquired firm against its own
current and future income, subject to the usual expiration provisions and a
variety of additional limitations that varied with how the transaction was
structured. Few such limitations applied when the benefits were those of the
larger, or acquiring firm being used to offset the income of the acquired—5—
company, as was true, for example, in several of the acquisitions by Penn
Central that appear in our sample.
The size of such benefits may actually be understated by focusing on
current tax carryforwards, since many firms with previous tax losses and
unused credits may also have ttbuilt-in" losses that will occur in the future.
For example, a firm with assets consisting of a depreciable capital good that
one year after purchase proved to be valueless will still be entitled to
depreciation deductions in subsequent years even without any cash flow from
the asset. Such losses have already occurred, in economic terms, but not for
tax purposes.
It has often been suggested that the presence of unused tax benefits does
not constitute an incentive to merge because firms can dispose of them in
other ways, including leasing and reducing debt. The premise of the "safe
harbor" leasing provisions introduced briefly in 1981 was to facilitate such
transfers, in part to reduce the possible incentives to merge (Warren and
Auerbach, 1982). However, the magnitude of unused tax benefits, and the
persistence of firms in states where they have such benefits, suggests that
the costs to such alternative activities must be large enough to discourage
their use in an important number of cases.
ii. Step-Up in Asset Basis
Many companies carry assets on their books with a basis for tax purposes
equal to a small fraction of their replacement cost. Such assets, if
depreciable, provide a small fraction of the depreciation allowances available
on equally productive, newly purchased capital, including used assets that are
resold. Hence, resale provides a channel for increasing such allowances.-6-
Opposing this potential tax gain is the tax that must be paid when an asset is
sold. Under prior law, the seller in a normal asset sale had to pay some
combination of capital gains and ordinary income taxes on the difference
between sale price and basis, making such sales by corporations generally
unprofitable for tax purposes (Gordon, Hines and Summers, 1987).
However, under the "General Utilities" doctrine, liquidating
distributions of assets to shareholders were exempt from the capital gains
portion of this tax liability. Such distributions occur, for example, when
one corporation acquires another and liquidates it. They could also occur
without an acquisition, with the corporation simply distributing its assets to
its individual shareholders. This has led some (e.g., Gilson, Scholes and
Wolfson, 1987) to argue that the tax advantage to liquidations does not
constitute a tax benefit associated with the act of merging. While there is
no empirical evidence of which we are aware on this issue, it seems plausible
that there are many cases in which the transaction costs of such liquidations
would be prohibitive, particularly when the value of the firm as a continuing
operation substantially exceeds the sum of the values of its individual
assets.
iii. Increased Interest Deductions
The theory of optimal capital structure has some difficulty explaining
the choice of debt-equity ratios in the presence of a substantial tax
advantage to debt. Except for Miller's (1977) theory that individual tax
advantages to equity entirely offset the corporate advantage to debt, most
hypotheses about optimal capital structure involve individual firms having
interior optimal debt—equity ratios determined by increasing costs to leverage—7—
associated, f or example, with increased expected bankruptcy costs, increased
agency costs, or the increased probability of tax losses. In these models,
the firm's costs of leverage may increase with the variance of itsearnings,
since such variance may be associated with higher probability of bankruptcy and
tax losses. Therefore, the reduction of idiosynchratic risk, which would
produce no value in a perfectly competitive model with efficient securities
markets, could increase value directly through a reduction in total bankruptcy
costs and frequency of tax losses, and indirectly through the reduced marginal
costs of borrowing. Hence, it is possible to derive models without
independent managerial motives in which it is optimal for firms to merge to
reduce own risk, with such models also suggesting that these combinations
would involve increased leverage.
Another way in which borrowing could encourage takeovers would be if one
of the manifestations of the "bad management" leading to takeovers isoverly
cautious debt policy. Because of the differing incentives of shareholders and
managers, ft is p'ausible that managers would choose to borrow less than a
value maximizing amount, since the risks associated with low earnings or
bankruptcy might be more costly to managers than shareholders. If current
managers are too risk averse, for example, new management could increase value
because of its decision to borrow more.
In addition, of course, one would expect increases in borrowing to the
extent that takeovers increase value by improving management or the
utilization of assets, since such activities essentially increase the scale of
the firm, presumably lowering the marginal borrowing cost for a9iven absolute
level of debt. However, unlike the first two cases, this would not-8-
necessarily lead to increased debt-equity ratios, nor would it be associated
with a particular type of merger, such as one in which risk is reduced or the
target initially has a low debt-equity ratio.
B.Shareholder Taxation
There are two primary ways in which acquired firms' shareholders receive
payment: shares in the parent (or combined) company, or cash. The mode of
payment may affect the use of corporate tax benefits. In addition, however,
the tax treatment of shareholders depends on the form of payment. If cash is
received, shareholders are normally taxable on their capital gains. If shares
are received, they may be taxable, but the firms may structure the transaction
as a reorganization and thereby defer shareholder taxation until the new
shares are sold. Each type of transaction has potential tax benefits beyond
those corporate level benefits already discussed.
In nontaxable stock transactions, shareholders typically receive shares
in a larger, more diversified enterprise in exchange for shares representing a
much larger fraction of a smaller company, a process which could facilitate
the achievement of a more balanced portfolio without the capital gains taxes
usually attendant upon such a move.In taxable cash transactions, the
acquiring firm distributes cash out of the corporate form at capital gains tax
rates. In models of corporate equity policy which explain the existence of
dividends through constraints on such behavior (which also encompasses the
repurchase of a company's own shares), such an activity may produce value
because firm values are depressed by the anticipation that the acquired firm's
value can only reach shareholders via fully taxed dividends (e.g. Auerbach,—9-
1979; Bradford, 1981; King, 1974). A recent paper by King (1986) estimatesan
aggregate model attempting to explain merger behavior in the U.K. as the result
of such a process.
3.Previous Findings
In our two earlier papers, we examined a sample of 3181mergers and
acquisitions that occurred during the period from 1968 to early 1983. The
sample consisted of all mergers and acquisitions in which both firms were on
the 1983 Compustat Industrial File or the 1983 Compustat Industrial Research
File and for which usable tax data were obtainable from the companies' annual
reports and 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Just
over three-quarters of these combinations occurred between 1976 and 1982.
Parent companies had an average value of equity plus long-term debt of 1.957
billion dollars (before the acquisition), while theaverage target firm's
value was just over one tenth of this, 204 million dollars.
Our estimates (in Auerbach and Reishus, 1987a) suggested that tax benefits
through increased use of tax losses and credits were potentially present in
about 20 percent of the mergers, with an average value of just over 10percent
of the target's market value in the year prior to themerger. We found
smaller evident benefits from stepping up asset basis, but encountered
substantial difficulty in estimating such benefits. Perhaps most surprising,
though we found noticeable increases in the absolute combined level of debt,
we found negligible increases in combined debt-equity ratios (calculated
before the merger by combining the debt and equity values for the separate
firms) over the period beginning two years before the merger years and ending
two years after.—10-
In our second paper, we focused on the relationship between the form of
the transaction and the type of tax benefits available. We found that
virtually all transactions were either nontaxable stock transactions or
taxable cash transactions, the majority being of the first type. This -is
significant, because in nontaxable transactions the firm has opted for a
corporate reorganization, which generally can not include a liquidation and
step—up of asset bases. Under a taxable transaction, either a liquidation
with step-up or a transer of tax attributes may be chosen. This su9gests that
taxable transactions might be more common when the potential basis step—up
benefits are large, but we could identify no such relationship, perhaps in
part because of our inability to measure such benefits precisely. Moreover,
since the the transfer of tax losses and credits is also treated somewhat
differently under a taxable transaction than under a tax-free reorganization,
there could be cases in which firms opting for a transfer of tax benefits
would still prefer the taxable (to the shareholders) transaction. Thus, it is
possible that firms would be responsive to taxes in their merger planning
without there being any discernable relationship between the type of tax
benefits available and the form of the transaction. This leaves the merger
decision itself to be evaluated in assessing the importance of tax factors.
4.A Model of Mergers and Acquisitions
In this section, we describe a simple model of mergers and acquisitions.
Though it is particularly well-suited to the questions we seek to answer, it
is applicable more generally. A related model is used by Hall (1987) to study
the relationship between mergers and research and development.—11-•
The model involves several simplifying assumptions. Although billedas a
marriage model, the marriage process is not one currently favored by most
cultures, polygamy. We assume that targets can be acquired only once within a
year and that parents can acquire as many targets as they wish. This latter
assumption leads to a model of the "choice" by prospective targets among
alternative acquirers.
In each year, we assume that every potential parent, x, evaluates a
function which indicates the joint gains from acquiring a targety, M(x,y).
The function M(x,y) may take on negative values, since theremay be
substantial transaction costs involved in a successful acquisition. If
V0(y)
is the value of y if it is not taken over, then firm x willpay up to V0(y) +
M(x,y)to acquire y. Thus, in a competitive market for y, the firm with the
highest valuation of y, say x*, will acquire y if M(x*,y) >0,for a price
between V0(y) +M(x*,y)and V0(y) +maxM(x',y). Note that the observed
xl
merger premium may be less than M(x',y), since the possibility of a merger may
have led the prior price to exceed V0(y).
We assume that the function M(x,y) has the specification:
(1) M(x,y) =Zxy
+xy
where the vector z includes variables that relate only to the target, only to
the parent, or to both, and £isa random disturbance representing benefits to
the merger not observed by the investigator. Perhaps the most crucial
assumption we make is the one that leads to a tractable empirical model. This
Is that the error term is uncorrelated with observed variables and takes on
the extreme value distribution. Following McFadden (1973), it is then
possible to express the probability that x1 will acquire y as:—12—
N
(2) p =eZxiY/(1+£ eXjY)
xiy j=1
which is a multinominal logit model of dimension N+1, where N is the number of
potential parent firms and the extra dimension is added by the possibility
that no merger occurs. As is well known, the multinomial logit model has
certain strong properties, such as the independence of irrelevant
alternatives, which in this case seems justifiable. This property also
simplifies the estimation procedure relative to an alternative approach such
as the multinomial probit. However, even for a multinomial logit it is
impractical to estimate a model of our dimensions.
This estimation problem has been dealt with in the previous literature in
two ways. One approach is to include a small sample of the alternatives. In
the current model, this would mean that each observation would involve a
potential target and several rather than all potential acquirers. For our
model, this estimation approach would pose problems. Many of the parent firm
characteristics that appear in the vector z, such as industry dummy variables,
occur relatively infrequently in the population. Thus, it might be necessary
to include a relatively large number of alternative parents to achieve
adequate sampling.
An alternative estimation approach is to treat all combinations with a
particular target except one as an aggregate "all other" state. Such
aggregation is not straightforward because of the nonlinearity of the
logistic specification. Suppose that f or the observation for a potential
target firm y the "all other" state includes all possible combinations aside—13-
from the one with potential parent x1. Then, to convert the multinomial
logit specification (2) into a trinomial logit, one must define the aggregate
state by the function
N
(3) f(z ,...,z )= inE eZxiY
X2' XNY i=2
Consider a second order Taylor expansion of the function f(.) around some
constant value a for each of its N—i arguments. After a couple of steps of
algebra, one obtains:
(4) in (N-i) + Z + j-1- E(zxyfra)2
-
where z is the mean of z ,i=2,...N. By choosing a =z,onecan rewrite y x1y y
(4) (since the last term on the right-hand side vanishes) as:
(5) . ln(N-i) + z + ia2(Zx.y)
or, letting Q be the matrix whose element is the sample covariance
between independent variables I and j,
(6)
f(Zx2yi...
ln(N-i) + z,I3 +
As argued by McFadden (1984), this approximate specification is exact when the
elements of the vector z are joint normally distributed, for then higher
moments of the Taylor approximation vanish.
This second approach to estimating a high dimension multinomial logit is
well-suited for our problem, because the sample means and variances of the—14-
independent variables of our model are easily estimated and have an intuitive
economic interpretation.
5.Sampling and Data Preparation
In the literature on mergers and acquisitions, there have been attempts
to estimate the factors leading to firms being taken over (e.g. Palepu, 1986)
by examining the differences between firms acquired and firms not acquired.
By looking at merger pairs, rather than just targets, and including firms that
were not acquired in the estimation procedure it should, in principle, be
possible to distinguish factors that affect the probability of a firm being
acquired from those that determine the actual match that occurs. The
acquisition probability should be influenced by target-specific variables that
enter both branches of the model just outlined, while the actual match should
be influenced by variables that depend on the actual pairing of potential
target and parent. This is quite important in the current context, where the
tax benefits available from a merger depend not only on the tax status of the
potential target but also on the ability of the potential acquirer to use
these benefits. If mergers occur for tax reasons, one would not expect the
firms acquired by Penn Central to have the same tax characteristics as those
acquired by IBM.
To the 316 observations on firms that were acquired, we added a similar
number of observations of firms chosen at random from the COMPUSTAT universe
of firms according to the following stratified sampling method.2 For each
actual merger, we chose a corresponding "pseudomerger" by choosing a
"pseudotarget" firm from all firms in the same size class and year as the—15--
target, and a "pseudoparent" firm from all firms in the same size class and
year as the parent. The sample of "pseudomergers" will therefore look almost
identical to the actual merger sample in terms of size and year, butmay
differ with respect to other variables of interest.
For each observation, variables were constructed for the target-parent
pair, and the corresponding variables for the aggregate "all other" pairs were
then constructed according to expression (6). The variables were either taken
directly or constructed from raw data provided by the Compustat files or the
annual reports and 10—K filings.
This particular sampling method was chosen for two reasons. Although the
optimal sampling scheme is uncertain, it has been suggested (Cosslett, 1981)
that an equal number of different alternatives is a good rule of thumb for
minimizing variance of estimates when the sample size is limited. The need to
obtain from microfiche the tax information for each observation serves to
limit our ability to expand the sample. The reason for stratifying the sample
on size and year is to match closely the mergers and "pseudomergers" on
variables which may be important but not of direct interest. Perhaps more
importantly this will serve to limit the unwanted effects of unobserved
variables correlated with year and size, as well as direct effects of time and
relative size that we would be unable to specify exactly. What we gain in
precision on our variables of interest, we lose in determining the effect of
time and relative size on merger activity.-16-
A.Nontax Variables
To test the importance of tax factors, it is necessary to control for the
other factors likely to affect mergers. Not doing so could clearly lead to
incorrect conclusions. For example, in our earlier work, we discovered that
there were nine cases in the 316 mergers in which both parent and target were
tax constrained. However, most of these were mergers of two firms within a
single industry, where a high correlation of profitability would lead one to
expect positive correlation of the incidence of tax constraints. Thus, if
firms in the same industry are more likely to merge than firms in different
industries, not controlling for this factor could lead to a downward bias in
the estimated impact of tax factors.
i. Target—Specific Variables
As discussed above, these are factors that affect the probability of a
firm being taken over, rather than of a specific merger. We include dummy
variables for the target firm's 1-digit SIC industry, to account for the
fact that mergers might relate to overall industry conditions. To pick up
growth-related merger motives we include the target firm's five year geometric
growth rate of sales.
As a measure of management competence, we would like a measure of the
market value of the firm to the replacement cost value of its assets. Since
firm assets include assets beyond those included in capital stock measures, we
suppose that each firm's true capital stock takes the form:
(7) K =Kf
+Ea,S1
where Kf is the fixed capital stock, a1 is a parameter to be estimated, and
S1 is a proxy for intangible assets, such as research and development—17—
expenditures or advertising. This leads to the inclusion of the variables
Kf-V and Si, where V is the firm's market value, which we approximate by the
market value of equity at the close of the previous year plus the book value
of financial liabilities. In some specifications, these variables are
expressed as ratios with respect to market value.
ii. Pair-Specific Variables
Here, we include dummy variables if the parent and target are in the
same industry. Because it is unclear how close two firms must be for them to
be in the "same" industry, we specify three dummy variables, equal to one if
the two firms are in the same 1-digit, 2——digit, and 4—digit SIC industries,
respectively.
Finally, we specify two dummy variables based on the relative size of the
two firms. The "same size" dummy variable equals 1 if the prospective parent
firm is in the same size class as the target or the next higher size class,
where these classes are defined in section 1 of the Appendix. For example, if
the target firm had a market value of 200 million dollars, this variable would
equal one for a parent with value between 100 and 500 million dollars. The
second size dummy, a "larger size" dummy, equals one if the parent is in one
of the next two higher size classes; in the example, this would be a firm with
value between 500 million and 5 billion dollars in assets. Both dummies will
equal zero only if the parent is substantially larger than the target (or much
smaller, though this event does not occur in the data set).-18-
B.Tax Variables
There are several variables that we consider to be tax-related. The first
is the target firm's debt-equity ratio. As suggested above, this could
indicate the presence of a potential for increasing interest deductions. We
would have preferred to include other variables potentially related to
borrowing, such as the reduction in risk, but data on the covariance of firm
earnings were not available or even estimable from what data we had.
The remaining variables are pair-specific. The first is the estimated
tax gain available from stepping up the basis of target assets. Because
equipment sales and liquidations are subject to recapture at ordinary income
tax rates, the main gains coming from avoidance of capital gains taxes should
be associated with structures and depletable resources.The appendix
describes the algorithm used to estimate such gains. Given the assumptions
necessary to make these calculations, the estimates are subject to substantial
error and could greatly understate the potential gains in cases where the
target firm has assets that have been on its books for many years and/or have
appreciated in value at a rate in excess of the inflation rate.
The appendix also describes the method used to estimate the gains from
the use of tax credits and tax losses. We assume such gains to be zero unless
one of the firms is fully taxable and the other is tax constrained. This is
conservative, in that there should be some gains in any case where the taxable
income of the two firms is not perfectly correlated. However, such gains are
hard to measure and arguably too small to have an impact on merger decisions.
Where the tax gain is positive, it is calculated under the assumption that the
firm with tax benefits becomes a shell after the mergers generating neither-19-
positive nor negative taxable income, and that the taxable firm uses these
benefits to the extent that the law permits. Here, we ignore the additional
restrictions that might apply to the full use of benefits in particularcases,
because of our inability to identify such cases.
The remaining tax-related variables are related to the shareholder tax
incentives for cash acquisitions. Here, we are limited by the absence of a
clear theory about the constraints firms face on the avoidance of dividend
taxes. If share repurchases are costly, then, as discussed above, a firm
wishing to distribute cash in excess of dividends will have the incentive to
engage in cash acquisitions in addition to repurchasing its own shares. The
same incentive would not be present for a firm already issuing new equity,
since cash acquisitions could not be financed by internal funds. Therefore,
we would expect constrained firms to be more likely to engage both in share
repurchases and cash acquisitions. This suggests that we include dummy
variables indicating whether the parent or pseudoparent firm has repurchased
its own shares in the past two years and whether it has sold common equity in
the past two years (in excess of threshold values of four percent of the
firm's shares). In an earlier study (Auerbach and Reishus, 1987b) we did
indeed find that, among firms that acquire, the probability of using cash asa
means of payment is (insignificantly) higher for firms that have recently
repurchased their own shares and (significantly) lower for those that have
recently issued new shares.-20-
C.Calculation of Variables for the Aggregate Alternative
For each observation, it is necessary to calculate the values of each of
the above variables that correspond to the state respresenting a merger with
one of "all other" potential parent firms. However, the only new calculations
needed are those for pair-specific variables, since the others have a value
that is independent of the characteristics of the potential parent.
For each pair-specific variable, the sample mean must be estimated for
inclusion in the vector z,,, and the sample covariance matrix Q is needed as
well. For dummy variables, the mean is simply the fraction of the population
in that category (defined to be all firms of equal or greater size). For
example, the mean corresponding to the "same industry" dummy is the fraction
of potential parent firms in the target's industry. The covariance term
between dummy variables equals the difference between the fraction of the
sample satisfying both characteristics and the fraction that would be
predicted by multiplying the sample means of each dummy variable.
For the continuous tax variables, the aggregate calculations are based on
the simplifying assumption that the value is either zero or a constant amount
based on the parent firm's tax status not being affected by combining with the
target. For example a firm with tax losses acquiring a profitable firm
retains excess losses after offsetting the target's taxable income, and a
taxable parent firm uses all the tax benefits of the target. This is quite
reasonable given the relative sizes of acquired and acquiring firms. Once
this value, say 1, is calculated for each potential target firm, the aggregate
mean is calculated as the product of this variable and the fraction of firms
in the state where the tax benefit can be used (taxable if the target is—21—
nontaxable, and tax-constrained if the target is taxable). The covariance
term of this variable with the same-industry dummy for example, equals the
fraction of all firms in the same industry and the opposite tax state of the
potential target, less the product of the same industry fraction and the
opposite tax state fraction, all multiplied by the magnitude of the tax
benefit.
6. Results
Before turning to the model estimates themselves, it is useful and
informative to compare selected statistics for the two samples of firm pairs,
those that actually merged and those that did not.
Table 1 presents mean changes in debt-value ratios for the two samples,
broken down further by the relative sizes of target and parent. For actual
mergers, the change is measured by subtracting the ratio of the two firms'
debt to those firms' debt plus equity two years before the merger year from
the same ratio for the surviving firm two years after the merger. Because of
data problems, only long-term debt (at book value) is used in the calculation.
The four-year period is used to distinguish "long run" leverage changes from
those that might occur only temporarily around the merger date. For
pseudomergers, the combined ratio is used for both dates in computing the
change.
The results in Table 1 cast doubt on the association of mergers with
increases in indebtedness. For only two of the five groups does the
difference in means have the "right" (positive) sign, and for neither of these
classes (nor for the total sample) is the difference significant. Only for—22—
the class where targets are roughly equal in size to parents is there any
discernible change in leverage, and here there are too few observations to
draw any conclusions. This does suggest that data from the post-1983 period,
which involved many more acquisitions of large firms, would be useful to
examine.
Table 2 presents estimates of the potential tax gains from the transfer
of tax losses and credits between parent and target. Again, the
calculations are done for both real and pseudomergers. For real mergers, just
under one-fifth of the pairs exhibit a tax gain, with a mean weighted gain of
10.5 percent of the target's market value. This mean is larger than the
estimate given in our earlier paper, in which a cruder method was used to
calculate the gain. There are fewer cases where the gain comes from the
parent, but the average gain in these cases is estimated to be much larger.
The incidence of tax benefits among the pseudomergers is remarkably similar, a
result which suggests that the transfer of tax losses and credits may not be
an important factor in the merger decision. However, there is a noticeable
difference between the samples in the magnitude of gains coming from cases
where the parent firm has unused tax losses and/or credits. These gains are
on average much lower for the pseudomerger sample than for the sample of
actual mergers. This suggests that distinguishing the source of the tax gain
may be important in the estimation procedure.
The estimated gains from the target's basis step-up are given in
Table 33 Once again, the differences between the two samples are negligible.
Further, based on our very imperfect measurement technique, the estimated
potential tax benefits from basis step-up are quite small, averaging only—23—
about 2 percent of the target's value and exceeding 5 percent inonly 7.8
percent of both real mergers and pseudomergers.
We turn next to the estimates of the full merger model. Results fora
variety of specifications are given in Tables 4 and 5. The estimated
equations differ according to whether certain variables are expressed in
levels or relative to the market value of the target firm.4
Table 4 presents estimates based on the level specification, while those
in Table 5 are for the ratio form. The theoretical model introduced in
Section 5 does not allow us to determine in advance which of these
specifications is to be preferred.
A number of variables are robust and quite significant in all
specifications. These include the target debt-value ratio, which has a
positive effect on the probability of a firm's being acquired, the target
firm's sales growth rate, and the same industry dummies,especially the
4-digit SIC industry dummy. The fact that each of the same industry dummies
is always positive suggests that firms are more likely tomerge the closer
their industrial relationship. The increasing magnitude of thesame industry
coefficients as one moves from the 1-digit to the 4-digit dummy means that the
incremental effect is also increasing: being in the same 4—digitindustry
relative to the same 2—digit industry has more of an effect on themerger
probability than being in the same 2-digit industry as opposed to the same
1-digit industry, for example. The results for industry dummies are
interesting but not unexpected, nor is the performance of the sales growth
term, given a similar finding by Palepu (1986). The influence of the
debt-value ratio, however, is quite surprising, given theargument that firms—24—
with unused debt-capacity are more likely to be taken over. One possible
explanation is that firms with high debt are firms in trouble, though other
variables included in the regression are intended to control for this
characteristic.
The target industry dummies suggest that (relative to the omitted
industries, those with SIC codes beginning with 8, which include Health,
Education, and Engineering) in only two broad industry groups were firms more
likely to be acquired during this period: Transportation, Communication and
Utilities and, to a lesser extent, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate.
Certain other variables are also robust to choice of specification and
always insignificant. These include the new share and repurchase variables
and the parent size variables. The pattern of the size variables suggests
that a firm is most likely to acquire other firms that are smaller than
itself, but not too much smaller. This is consistant with our observation in
Auerbach and Reishus (1987a) that parents are typically larger than the
targets they acquire but that relative size is correlated. The repurchase
variable has the "wrong" sign in that it suggests firms that have repurchased
are less likely to acquire other firms. This result does not necessarily
constitute evidence against the "trapped equity" inducement for cash mergers.
It may simply mean that firms wishing to get excess cash out of the corporate
form tend to specialize in their method, either repurchasing or engaging in
cash acquisitions. If this specialization were strong enough, then the
observation of a firm repurchasing would reduce the expectation that it would
also engage in a cash merger, even though, conditional on its decision to
acquire, it would still be more likely to use cash (as suggested by our—25—
previous results cited above). This problem of interpretation underscores the
need for a more rigorous model of the constraints that cause equity to be
"trapped" and the optimal behavior of firms in response to these constraints.
The performance of the remaining variables, including the tax variables,
depends on the model specification. The tax gain variable always has the
correct sign, and is significant in the level specification. However, when
this variable is broken down into two variables according to the source of the
tax gains (target or parent), only tax gains from the potential parent are
significant in the level specification. This is entirely consistent with the
results given in Table 2, where the only noticeable difference between the
sample of real mergers and that of pseudomergers was for the case of
parent-related tax gains. Moreover, it is plausible that the target firm tax
benefits would present less of an incentive because of the additional
restrictions on their use that we have not taken into account.
Despite this statistical significance, however, the parent's tax variable
is of little economic importance. Depending on the exact specification
setting the value of the parent's tax gain to zero (which simulates the impact
of a policy change making the transfer of such benefits impossible) reduces
the predicted number of mergers by between just under 1 percent and just over
1.5 percent. In contrast, the predicted number of mergers would be reduced by
well over one-half by setting the same-4-digit SIC industry dummy variable
equal to zero (which simulates the impact of a policy of prohibiting
combinations of firms in the same 4—digit industry occurring with a frequency
that cannot be explained by other factors).
The basis step-up variable is disturbingly sensitive to whether the ratio
or the level specification is used and to whether industry dummies are-26-
included. In the level specification, it always has the wrong sign. In the
ratio specification, it has the wrong sign in the two specifications without
industry dummies but is significant and has the predicted sign with the
industry dummies present. If this last model were correct, then the predicted
decline in mergers associated with a removal of the tax benefits from basis
step-up would be over 8 percent, much larger than the predicted impact of
removing the ability to transfer losses and credits. However, the instability
of this variable's performance and the problems in its construction leads us
to discount the importance of this result.
The results for the remaining three variables, which are intended to
measure the difference between market value and the value of asset, are also
sensitive to whether level or ratio form is used. Under the former, all are
quite insignificant. Under the latter, the gap between book and market value
has the correct sign and is significant, while the R and 0 variable has the
"wrong" sign and is significant. It should be pointed out, however, that this
sign for R and 0 is wrong in a very limited sense, if R and 0 affects the
merger probability only through its use in correcting our measure of the
firm's asset replacement cost. If R and 0 spending exerts an independent
influence on the probability of a firm's acquisition, then it is not clear
without further modelling what sign one should expect it to have.
In summary, then, the basic model specification seems good in that
variables one associates with acquisitions, such as industry relationship and
growth, are consistently significant. The significance of the debt-value
ratio is also quite robust, through we are not certain how this is to be
rationalized. Given the results in Table 1, however, it is quite hard to—27—
'argue that acquisitions by large corporations were driven during thisperiod
by the opportunity to tap unused target debt capacity.5 The performance of
the tax gain variable suggests a mild positive effect of tax losses and
credits experienced by the potential acquirer, but little effect of those
experienced by the potential target. Finally, the basis step-up variable,
whose accuracy we have questioned, is of the correct sign (but significant) in
only one specification. The values of the likelihood function for ratio and
level specifications are virtually identical, making it difficult to decide
which model is "best."
7. Conclusion
The object of this paper has been to consider the impact of taxes on the
frequency of mergers and acquisitions in the United States over the period
1968-83. To do this, we have compared the tax characteristics of a sample of
merging firms to those of a similar sample of nonmerging firms chosen at
random and, using both samples, estimated a "marriage" model ofmerger
activity. Our results suggests that the potential increase in interest
deductions could not have been an important factor influencingmerger activity
during this period. The two samples exhibit quite insignificant differences
in borrowing patterns, and the logit model estimates suggest that a lower
debt-equity ratio is associated with a lower probability that a firm will be
acquired.
Likewise, the tax benefits associated with the acquisition of a firm with
tax losses or unused tax credits appear to exert an insignificant influence on
merger activity. The frequency and size of such benefits is virtually the same-28—
in the real merger sample and the pseudomerger sample, and the size of the
potential benefit has no explanatory power in the merger model. One reason for
this may be the existence of a variety of restrictions on the use of such tax
benefits that, because of their complexity, we have ignored in our analysis.
The two potential tax benefits that do appear to have some impact on
merger activity are the use of tax losses and credits by acquiring companies
to offset the taxable income of firms they acquire and the option to step up
the basis of the assets of acquired firms without paying corporate level
capital gains taxes. The first of these is significant in some of the model
estimates and is more important in the sample of real mergers than the sample
of pseudomergers. However, it is of little economic importance in explaining
the frequency of mergers. The second is significant in one of the
specifications estimated, but has the wrong sign in all others. Given the
difficulty we have encountered in measuring this variable accurately, we are
somewhat suspicious of this finding of potential significance.
In terms of the avoidance of individual taxes, we have found that firms
that have repurchased their own shares in the past two years are less likely
to acquire other firms. This result is hard to relate to the theory that
firms seek cash acquisitions to free "trapped equity" without a rigorous model
of the constraints on and determinants of repurchase activity.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 attempted to discourage tax-driven
acquisitions by repealing the "General Utilities" doctrine that permitted the
tax-free basis step up and by limiting the use of tax losses and credits of
acquired firms. Our findings suggest that the latter restriction is of little
importance. Ironically, the use of acquiring firms' tax benefits, which-29-
appears to have some impact on merger activity, was not restricted by the
recent legislation. A change that, some have argued, could encourage mergers
is the strengthening of the corporate alternative minimum tax. Just as with
the asymmetry associated with gains and losses, it will be possible for firms
subject to the minimum tax to combine with taxable firms not subject to the
minimum tax and reduce combined tax payments. However, the potential tax
reductions would appear smaller (since the difference between the two firms'
marginal tax rates is lower) than for the combination of a taxable and
nontaxable firm. Given our findings about mergers between such types of
firms, we strongly doubt that the minimum tax provisions will have a
significant impact on merger activity.
The results in this paper should be regarded with caution, given the many
assumptions that were necessary to estimate the potential tax benefits
associated with particular mergers. Without access to the confidential tax
returns of the firms involved, such assumptions are unavoidable. Another
limitation that deserves mention is the terminal date of our sample: early
1983. Since then, the character of the acquisition process has changed, with
many more "megamergers" occurring in which larger firms were acquired. There
is some inconclusive evidence in our Table 1 that such mergers may, on
average, be associated with increases in leverage for the combined enterprise.
Recent observations should facilitate a more precise evaluation of this
proposition, along with the one that borrowing to finance acquisitions has, in
general, become more important in recent years.-30-
Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the methods used for sampling and
calculating the variables.
1.Sampling
The real and "pseudo" samples were matched by year and assets of both
parent and target. The method for calculating assets are explained below.
The size categories were (in millions) 1 to 10, 10 to 25, 25 to 50, 50 to 100,
100 to 250, 250 to 500, 500 to 1,000, 1,000 to 5,000, 5,000 and up, as well as
a category f or missing value. The missing values were eliminated for the
regressions, which left 310 real mergers, and 291 pseudomergers. The
difference is due to the inability to collect meaningful tax or asset
information on a portion of the pseudo mergers.
2.Gain From Use of Tax Losses and Credits
This calculation uses the income tax paid, tax loss carry forward, and
investment tax credit carryforward information obtained from corporate
reports. When a firm without carryforwards and positive tax payments combines
with a firm which has carryforwards, we calculate the potential benefit. We
assume that the unconstrained firms' level of tax payments grows at 10 percent
nominal rate into the future, while the firm with the loss carryforward
contributes no new losses, but also no new taxable income in the future —-it
is simply a shell for holding tax loss carryforwards. We then calculate the
net present value of the tax payments (discounted at 10 percent) combining the
two firms' tax attributes through the period when the carryforward is used up—31—
or expires. The net present value of the tax payments of the two firms
separately is also calculated using the same assumptions for the same time
period. The difference between the combined calculation and the sum of the
separate calculations is the tax benefit.
The aggregate calculation is much cruder. If the target is paying
positive taxes, then we use three times the tax payment as the tax gain from
merging with a parent who has a tax loss carryforward as indicated by
Compustat. For targets with tax losses, we use the value of the actual tax
loss as the potential benefit for parents who do not have tax loss
carryforwards as indicated by Compustat.
3.Basis Step-Up
We begin with the firm's book value of fixed assets at the end of the
last year before the merger. Using data on the firm's gross investment and
the capital stock at the end of the earliest year for which it is available
for the firm, we use the 'tperpetual inventory" method to estimate the rate of
declining balance depreciation that is consistent with the firm's initial and
terminal capita1 stocks. Given this estimate of economic depreciation, we
then estimate the current market value of the capital stock by multiplying
capital remaining from different vintage by the ratio of the price
(represented by the GNP deflator) in the current year to that for the year in
which the capital was purchased. We also assume that the initial capital




where Kt is the book capital stock at the end of year t and is fixed





We assume that a fraction 9 of this market value is structures, where 0 is the
fraction that structures represent for all firms in the same industry (taken
from Auerbach, 1983). Note that this will understate the market value of
assets that have increased in nominal value at a rate in excess of the GNP
deflator or were worth more than their book value even at time zero.
Since structures are written off at a different rate from equipment, they
will generally represent a different fraction of the book capital stock than
of the market value capital stock. Since structures decay more slowly the
book fraction will be smaller: inflation has a greater effect on the ratio of
the current to book value as the time since purchase increases.
If one assumes that the structures fraction of the firm's capital stock
at time zero was also 6, and that structures are written off at the declining






where itisthe average inflation rate over the period 0 to I and g is the
nominal growth rate of investment in structures. These are easily calculated—33-
for each firm. We set y =.033,the aggregate value derived in Auerbach and
Hines (1987).
Given the market value of the firm's structures capital stock, we
estimate the after-tax value of depreciation allowances the firm would receive
by multiplying the corporate tax rate by the average present value of
depreciation allowances on all structures, estimated by Auerbach and Hines
(1987). It is somewhat more difficult to estimate the depreciation allowances
the firm would receive if continuing along its previous depreciation schedule
since its capital stock purchase dates are now known. We simply assume that
they would get the same present value as is available on new capital per each
dollar of remaining basis. Moreover, we assume that recapture will neutralize
the additional depreciation allowances received on increases in basis up to
the straight line basis, and that this latter basis equals the actual book
value. Thus, the net estimated gain is the present value of depreciation
allowances of new structures, multiplied by the corporate tax rate, multiplied
by the difference between market and book values estimated for structures.
There are 35 real targets and 46 pseudotargets for which there was
insufficient data to perform the basis step-up calculations. For these firms,
we use an imputed value equal to the sample average. Use of a separate
missing-value dummy variable did not substantively alter the results.
4.Asset Value
Based on Compustat data, the value of a firm is calculated as the market
value (year-end) of common stock plus the book value of long-term debt,
short-term debt and preferred stock in the year preceding the merger. For an
important fraction of targets a closing stock price was unavailable for that—34-
year; if the calculation provided a missing value, we took this value from the
previous year.-.35—
Footnotes
1.We have subsequently discovered problems with data in two of the mergers,
and so have only 316 observations in the current paper.
2.There are actually 291 such observations because of data problems
encountered after the second sample was chosen.
3.These are given for all targets and pseudotargets, including the
relatively small number matched with a nontaxable parent or pseudoparent who
could not use the tax benefits. In the estimation procedure below, the
potential gain is set to zero in such cases.
4.In all versions of the model estimates reported in the paper, we weight
each observation based on the sampling frequency of the target firm's size
class as well as status (acquired or not acquired). In principal, this is the
correct approach, though it gives some observations substantial weight. We
also tried an alternative weighting scheme that did not distinguish sample
weights by size. The coefficients for most variables were nearly identical,
though one of the tax variables, the parent's tax gain, had its size reduced
somewhat in some specifications.
5.Needless to say, one cannot and should not interpret this finding as
applying to the going-private leveraged buyouts that are not included in our
sample.-36-
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<.1 107 0 71 .013 -0.64
.1 —.25 60 —.032 60 -.011 —0.75
.25 -.50 40 .018 38 -.015 1.01
.50 -.75 14 -.014 21 .028 —0.76
>.75 25 .071 22 —.032 1.59
TOTAL 246 .001 212 -.002 0.21
Notes:
Relative target size is ratio of target value (debt plus equity) to parent
value in year before merger. Total number of firms is somewhat lower than
overall sample size because of missing data.
T-statistics are for a test of equality of means. Means are unweighted within




TotalFrom TargetFrom ParentTotal From TargetFrom Parent
0 255 235
<.05 26 19 7 23 16 7
.05—.10 11 7 4 10 7 3
.10—.25 14 9 5 17 9 8
>.25 10 3 7 6 4 2
Fraction

















Gains are expressed as a fraction of target firm value (long-term debtplus
equity). Mean gains are for those pairs with positive gains, with target firm
values used when weighting.Table 3: Potential Gains from Basis Step-Up
Size of Gain Real Mergers (#=281) Pseudomergers (#=245)
< .05 259 226
.05—.1O 12 12
.1O—.25 9 6





Gains are expressed as a fraction of target firm value. Total number of firms
is somewhat lower than overall sample size because of missing data.Table 4
Logit Model Estimation Results





Constant 11.50 11.50 10.62
(18.35) (18.33) (6.29)
Target Debt-Value 3.64 3.64 2.72
Ratio (5.04) (5.03) (2.80)
Target Sales 1.99 1.98 2.75
Growth Rate (2.28) (2.27) (2.25)
Same 1—digit 1.45 1.45 1.47
SIC (1.68) (1.67) (0.79)
Same 2-digit 2.34 2.34 3.38
SIC (1.98) (1.96) (2.29)
Same 4-digit 6.60 6.60 6.95
SIC (7.54) (7.51) (9.11)
Same Size -.61 -.61 -.55
Parent (—.92) (-.91) (-.66)
Larger Size .36 .36 .50
Parent (.55) (.55) (.58)
New Shares -.07 -.06 .22
Issued (—.12) (—.11) (.35)
Shares —.85 -.85 -.86
Repurchased (-1.26) (-1.26) (—1.01)
Tax Gain* .20
(3.24)
Tax Gain* -.09 -.60
Target (—.13) (—.54)
Tax Gain* .22 .22





Basis Step-up* -3.10 -3.07 —1.13
(—1.97) (—1.85) (—1.34)
Target Book-Market* -.05 -.05 -.07
Value (-.57) (—.56) (—.72)
Target Advertising* .03 .05 .33
(.03) (.03) (.16)




1 (Mining and Resource —1.80
Extraction) (.99)
2 (Nondurable Goods 1.49
Manufacturing) (.87)
3 (Durable Goods 1.15
Manufacturing) (.67)
4 (Transporation, Communi- 4.31
cation and Utilities) (2.24)
5 (Retail Sales) 1.00
(.58)





t-statistics are in parentheses.
In "ratio" specifications, starred variables are divided by target firm's
market value.Table 5
Logit Model Estimation Results





Constant 11.59 11.62 10.87
(19.14) (18.57) (6.60)
Target Debt-Value 3.55 3.44 2.33
Ratio (4.83) (4.56) (2.25)
Target Sales 2.33 2.43 3.29
Growth Rate (2.57) (2.56) (2.79)
Same 1-digit 1.41 1.40 1.47
SIC (1.59) (1.56) (0.81)
Same 2—digit 2.25 2.23 3.26
SIC (1.82) (1.80) (2.21)
Same 4-digit 6.76 6.78 6.96
SIC (7.35) (7.31) (8.76)
Same Size —.69 -.69 -.61
Parent (—1.11) (—1.13) (—.79)
Larger Size .35 .34 .49
Parent (.56) (.55) (.61)
New Shares -.11 -.10 .19
Issued (—.20) (—.18) (.31)
Shares -.87 —.85 -.90
Repurchased (—1.26) (—1.23) (—1.07)
Tax Gain* .27 --
(.69)
Tax Gain* -.02 -.90
Target (-.05) (-.69)
















t—statistics are in parentheses.















































6 (Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate)
7 (Services)